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TnE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX AND CHA=rABLE DiSPosmONs: PROFESsiONAL
ASSOCIATIONS AND GIFTS IN TRUST
I. Introduction
In making a testamentary gift to a professional association, a taxpayer
who intends his gift for a charitable, scientific, or educational purpose encoun-
ters section 2055 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.' To qualify for an
estate tax deduction under this section, a charitable transfer must be one of
two quite distinct types. If it is to a charitable2 corporation, then the corpora-
tion' must be organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes, with
no substantial part of its activity directed towards influercing legislation. If it
is a transfer to a trustee or trustees, it must be used by the trustees exclusively
for charitable purposes, and no substantial part of the trustee's activities may
be prohibited political activity. The distinction between thise two types of
dispositions is not necessarily a clear one. In RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS
§ 348, comment f (1959), it is said:
Charitable corporations. Property may be devoted to charitable pur-
poses not only by transferring it to individual trustees to hold it for such
purposes, but also by transferring it to a charitable corporation. It may
be provided that the corporation shall take the property, for any of the
purposes for which the corporation is organized. It may be provided that
the corporation shall take the property for only one of its purposes ....
Where property is given to a charitable corporation, particularly where
restrictions are imposed by the donor, it is sometimes said by the courts
that a charitable trust is created and that the corporation is a trustee. It
is sofietimes said, however, that a charitable trust is not created. , This
1 INT. REv. CoDE or 1954, § 2055: Transfers for public, charitable, and religious uses.
(a) . . For -purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001, the value of the taxable estate
shall be determifned by deducting from the value of the gross estate the amount of all bequests,
legacies, devises, or transfers ....
(2) to or for the use of any corporation organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, literary or educational purposes,' including the encour-
agement of art and the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part oft the
net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or individual,
and no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, oi other-
wise attempting, to influence legislation;
(3) to a trustee or trustees, or a fraternal society, order, or association operat-
ing under the lodge system, but only if such contributions or gifts are to be used by
such trustee or trustees, or by such fraternal society, order, or association, exclusively
for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or for the pre-
vention of cruelty to children or animals, and no substantial part of the activities of
such trustee or trustees, or of such fraternal society, order, or association, is carrying
on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation ....
See generally, BoGRT, TRuSTS AND TRuSTEES § 275.5 (2d ed. 1964); 4 MERTENS, FEDERAL
GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION ch. 28 (1959, Supp. 1965).
2 The word "charitable" will be used throughout to represent religious, charitable, scien-
tific, literary, and educational purposes.
3 Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-1 (a) (2) (1958) added.after the word "corporation,"',the words
"or association." But see John C. Polster, 31 T.C. 874 (1959), rev'd on other grounds;
274 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1960), where the Tax Court held that a transfer to an unincorporated
religious association was not valid. See generally, Bogert, op. cit. supra note 1, § 328, at n.94.
is a mere matter of terminology. The important question is whether and
to what extent the principles and rules applicable to charitable trusts are
applicable to charitable corporations.4
The tax consequences, however, make this distinction more than a mere matter
of terminology. If a transfer to a corporation is to qualify for a deduction under
section 2055, the corporation must fulfill the statutory requirements. But, if
the gift is one to a trustee, only the purposes for which the gift is to be used, as
stated by the donor-testator, need meet the requirements ofsection 2055.'
Professional associations are in a twilight area in the law of charitable
gifts.' Several recent cases have dealt with the strict requirements of section
2055, and two have allowed the deduction. In Dulles v. Johnson7 outright
gifts to the New York State Bar Association, the New York County Bar Asso-
ciation, and the Association of the Bar of the City of New York were held to
qualify as gifts to charitable corporations that fulfilled the tests of the Code.
Similarly, in Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. United States, a bequest to uphold
the standards of the bar qualified as a trust for exclusively charitable purposes.
In contrast, in Saint Louis Union Trust Co. v. United States,' a bequest to the
Bar Association of St. Louis was found by a jury to be a transfer to an organi-
zation not organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes.
Medical associations have also been objects of testators' bounty. In Ham-
merstein v. Kelly"° and Krohn v. United States," the St. Louis Medical Society
and the Denver Medical'Society, respectively, failed to meet the exempt organi-
zation test.
This note analyzes the federal estate tax on gifts to these and like pro-
fessional associations. It focuses on the qualifications imposed on transfers to
charitable corporations and transfers to trustees. The possibility of qualifying
a transfer for an exemption which would otherwise fail as an outright gift to a
corporation is also examined. The transfer may be found to qualify either because
it is expressly a gift in trust'or could be construed as a gift in trust.
II. The Law
For purposes of this analysis, it is profitable to reflect on the basic idea of
the charitable deduction contained in section 2055. The rationale for the law
is that
the Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from
4 The comment goes on to list the applicable rules: The corporation must apply property
to the purposes for which it is organized. Where a purpose is specified, this'must be observed.
The doctrine of cy pres is applicable.
Rules applicable to charitable trusts not applicable to charitable corporations include: the
duty of the trustee to account to the probate court; the remedy of one to whom the charitable
trust has incurred a liability; and the visitorial power of the founder of a charitable corporation.
See generally, comment, 26 So. CAL. L. Rav. 80 (1952).
5 Bettie B. Brown, 21 B.T.A. 1201 (1931), rev'd on other grounds, 59 F.2d 922 (8th Cir.
1932).
6 See generally, 4 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 375.2 (2d ed. 1956).
7 273 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 834 (1960).
8 159 F. Supp. 204 (D.R.I. 1958).
9 16 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6173 (E.D. Mo. 1965).
10 235 F. Supp. 60 (E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1965).
11 246 F. Supp. 341 (D. Colo. 1965). -
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firiancial burden which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations
froni public funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of
the general welfare.12  -
Thus, the law is basically a self-interest measure for the protection of the govern-
ment. A private body will do what the government may otherwise have to do.
But this is less than a complete explanation, for there are many tasks the govern-
ment cannot undertake, such as promoting religion, or should not undertake,
such as propagandizing the public. Nevertheless, these are necessary and legiti-
mate purposes; in certain situations, the organizations engaged in such activities
are the recipients of favorable tax treatment. The question narrows itself, to
the drawing of boundaries to determine the extent the taxpayer and the organi-
zation to which he contributes are to be subsidized by the remainder of society.
This is the recurrent and, at times, unspoken premise which may explain some
of the decisional law in this area.
A. The Organization Test
The statutory exemption from paying federal income taxes granted an
exempt organization,' the allowance of an individual deduction for income
tax purposes when a contribution is made to an exempt organization, 4 and
the federal gift ' and estate tax deductions 0 all speak in the rhetoric of "organ-
ized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes." The regulations interpret-
ing the income tax exemption for an exempt organization are the most detailed.
They make clear that the test is a dual one: The organization must be organized
for, and operated for, an exclusively charitable purpose. The articles of the
organization must:
(a) Limit the purposes of such organization to one or more exempt
purposes; and
(b) .. . [N]ot expressly empower the organization to engage, other-
wise than as an insubstantial part of its activities, in activities which in
themselves are not in furtherance of one or more exempt purposes.'"
This dual requirement has caused organizations to write their charters in statu-
tory language, but the requirement that the charter allow only exempt purposes
is often overlooked. 8 Where a charter provided organization 'for "education
in the field of government,"' 9 it was found to be too general. In this case, a
corporation was organized to hold seminars and workshops on college 'campuses
and to stimulate participation by the American business community in govern-
mental and political affairs. This purpose was held not to be exclusively edu-
cational within the meaning of section 501(c) (3), which provides educational
organizations with an exemption from the payment of the income tax. How-
12 H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 18 (1938).
13 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 501.
14 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 170.
15 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2522.
16 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2055.
17 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c) (3)-1(b) (1) (i) (a), 1.501(c) (3)-1(b) (1) (i) (b) (1959).
18 See Note, 57 COLUm. L. REv. 273, 275 (1957).
19 Rev. Rul. 60-193, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 195, 197.
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ever, such an organization could qualify for an exemption from the payment
of the income tax because it meets the statutory test of an organization operated
exclusively for the promotion of social welfare under section 501 (c) (4). This
illustration calls attention to the illogical character of the tax structure. While
transfers have failed repeatedly *to qualify for the federal estate tax deduction,
the recipient of the attempted transfer has very little difficulty finding an
exemption from the payment of income taxes."0
The government looks not only to the organization's charter, but also to
its bylaws.21 Older cases seem to have emphasized the organization test as a
basis for disqualification. In Frank E. Castle,22 a bequest to a medical society
was denied preferred tax treatment, despite a complete absence of a showing
of actual operation outside the scope of the statute. A provision in the society's
charter enumerated as one of the purposes of the organization "the promotion
of good understanding and harmonious intercourse and the mutual improve-
ment of the members." A similar case was Robbins B. Stoeckel,23 where .an
amended charter listed the purposes of the organization in statutory form. The
fact that an earlier charter had allowed the promotion of "good-fellowship and
social intercourse" was held to indicate that the organization's social aspects
were not incidental, resulting in the disallowance of an estate tax deduction
to a group providing scholarship funds.
Recent cases have taken a broader view. Dulles v. Johnson2 4 noted that
the organization test must be coupled with the operation test. Consequently,.
an organization should not be disqualified solely on the basis of a discordant
organizational purpose. The regulations, however, have not as yet adopted this
liberal approach. They have qualified the organizational test only to the extent
of allowing an "insubstantial" nonexempt purpose, and "the fact that the actual
operations of such an organization have been exclusively in furtherance of one
or more exempt purposes shall not be sufficient to permit the organization to
meet the organizational test... ,, 25
B. The Operation Test
The second test of section 2055 is that the organization be operated for
exclusively charitable purposes. As might be anticipated, a requirement with
such absolute implications has caused difficulties. It has been expanded beyond
its literal sense in two areas. The first is the age-old interpretation of the word
"charitable." 2 The second relates to a limitation of "exclusively charitable," so
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 19 B.T.A. 174 -(1930). A case of like severity was Greiss v. United States, 146 F. Supp.
505 (N.D. Ill. 1956), where a sportsmen's club was held to be neither organized nor operated
for exclusively scientific, educational, or charitable purposes. Good-fellowship was one of the
purposes enumerated by the bylaws; fly-tying, rod building, and the showing of African safari
movies were the illustrative nonexempt operations. These were held not to be conservation
purposes.
23 2 T.O. 975 (1943).
24 155 F. Supp. 275, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See Samuel Friedland Foundation v. United
States, 144 F. Supp. 74 (D.N.J. 1956). "To some degree, 'organized cannot be divorced
from 'operated,' for the true purposes of an organization may well have to be drawn in final
analysis from the manner in which the corporation has been operated." Id. at 85.
25 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3) (1) (b) (iv) (1959).
26 See text accompanying notes 79-80 infra.
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that the decisional law now causes it to be read "substantially charitable.""2
Congress has been in full agreement with this interpretation. In 1934 it added
another qualification that read "no substantial part of the activities of which
is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation."'
(Emphasis added.) In Seasongood v. Commissioner,29 the Sixth Circuit applied
the substantial activities test. It held that five percent of the activities of a good
government league devoted to propaganda was not substantial; thus a contribu-
tion to the organization was deductible for income tax purposes. Also, where an
estate tax exemption was claimed for a gift to an art club, the court found that
the club's social activities did not conflict with the assertion that it was operated
exclusively for charitable purposes.
The answer to this question depends upon whether the activities of said
Club are primarily and predominantly in furtherance of said purposes. The
existence of other activities, social in nature, if merely auxiliary to these
purposes does not constitute a ground for denying the exemption. The term
"exclusively" as used in section 2055(a) (2) is to be given a different
connotation from that ordinarily accorded to it.3°
Another interpretation has been that the questionable activity permitted an
exempt organization must be no more than "incidental, contributing, or sub-
servient to a primary purpose.""1 Lest it be thought this is a wide open avenue
where the substantial and insubstantial are blurred, a recent dissenting opinion
examines an argument the court would not accept.
We are unable to escape the conclusion that the League of Women
Voters is a completely unselfish organization operating almost exclusively in
the public interest. It is clearly not the type of organization which the Con-
gress meant to exclude from the benefits of the tax-exemption sections. The
activities of the League are in no sense partisan. It is almost wholly educa-
tional in nature.
3 2
C. The Political Activity Test
The third test which the activities of both a charitable corporation and a
trustee must meet under section 2055 is that "no substantial part of the [activity]
... is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation."
Before examining the construction of this part of the statute, a prohibition, de-
veloped in the older cases, should be considered. Where a trust has been created
27 Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955); Industrial Nat'l Bank v.
United States, 187 F. Supp. 810 (D.R.I. 1960); Robert Marshall, 2 T.C. 1048 (1943), afl'd,
147 F.2d 75 (2dCir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 872 (1945).
28 48 Stat. 690 (1934), § 170.
29 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955).
30 Industrial Natl Bank v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 810, 815 (D.R.I. 1960).
31 Robert Marshall, 2 T.C. 1048 (1943), aff'd, 147 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 325
U.S. 872 (1945). See 1950-1 CuM. BULL. 3, acquiescing in Huntington Nat'l Bank, 13 T.C.
760 (1949). Here a women's club activity supporting child welfare and education was found
not to be substantial. 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 8 acquiescing in Philip R. Thayer, 24 T.C. 384
(1955), wherein alumni association social activity was found not to be substantial. Accord,
Rev. Rul. 60-143 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 192.
32 League of Women Voters v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 379, 386 (Ct. Cl.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 822 (1960). See 39 TExAs L. Rv. 525 (1961).
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to change the law, it has often encountered hostility. In Jackson v. Phillips"
a trust to further the cause of women's rights was struck down. Said Mr. Justice
Gray:
This bequest differs .., in aiming directly and exclusively to change the
laws. . . .Whether such an alteration of the existing laws and frame of
government would be wise and desirable is a question upon which we
cannot, sitting in a judicial capacity, properly express any opinion. Our
duty is limited to expounding the laws as they stand. And those laws do
not recognize the purpose of overthrowing or changing them, in whole
or in part, as a charitable use.... 34
Professor Scott believes this notion - that a trust to change the law is non-
charitable - is thoroughly rejected by the courts. " Supporting such a view is
International Reform Fed'n v. District Unemployment Compensation Bd."4
This case involved a successful claim for an exemption from payment under the
Social Security Law - which also denies an exemption to those who carry on
propaganda"7 - by an organization which attempted to legislate its conceptions
of morality in such areas as prohibition, white slavery, and drugs. The court,
after reviewing the cases that had refused educational or, charitable status to
organizations seeking changes in the law, and the older line of reasoning that a
court is unable to decide if a change in the law will, or will not, be in the public
interest, held: "[T]his reasoning is not convincing, and we prefer the more
modem view that so long as the purpose can be thought by some to be in the
public interest, the court is not concerned with its wisdom.""
8
One of the original cases construing the political activity section is Slee v.
Commissioner." It was held there that a gift to the American Birth, Control
League was not deductible for purposes of computing a taxpayer's income tax.
The court's reasoning has been repeatedly cited.
[T]he Treasury stands aside from [political agitation].... Nevertheless there
are many charitable, literary and scientific ventures that as an incident to
their success require changes in the law. A charity may need a special
charter allowing it to receive larger gifts than the general laws allow. It
would be strained to say 'thai for this reason it became less exclusively
charitable, though much might have to be done to convince legislators.
. . . A state university is constantly trying to get appropriations from the
Legislature; for all that, it seems to us still an exclusiVely educational in-
stitution.... All such activities are mediate to the primary purpose, and
33 96 Mass. (14- Allen) 539 (1867).
34 Id. at 571. Accord, Bowditch v. Attorney Gen., 241 Mass. 168, 134 N:E. 796 (1922).
35 4 SCOTT, Op. cit. supra note 6, § 374.4, at 2677. See BOGRT, op. rit. supra n6te 1, §
378.
36 131 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,,317 U.S. 693 (1942). Contra, Herbert E. Fales,
9 B.T.A. 828 (1927) (same organization).' See Taylor v. Hoag, 273 Pa, 194, 116 At. 826
(1922) (Trust to change the law allowed). - )
37 INT. REv. CODE op 1954, § 3121(b) (8) (B).
38 131 F.2d 337, 340 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S.-693 (1942).
39 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.). See Martha Hubbard Davis, 22 T.C. 1091
(1954), following Judge Hand's language and holding eligible an organization which sought
the advancement of such legislative goals as child welfare, mental health, and sanitation. See
generally, Clark, The Limitations on Political Activities: A Discordant Note in the Law of




would not, we should think, unclass the promoters. The agitation is ancillary
to the end in chief, which remains the exclusive purpose of the association.40
The American Birth Control League, as shown by the evidence, was not this
type of organization. It was not attempting to free the organization from a re-
straint or obtain an advantage. Rather, it was engaged in general agitation for
the repeal of antibirth-control laws.
The League of Women Voters has been a frequent visitor to the courts
for a construction of the political activities section of the revenue laws; results
have varied.' Women agitating for reform have encountered the political activi-
ties prohibition in other contexts as well.42
Seasongood v. Commissioner"' has become somewhat of a classic in this
field. The Hamilton County Good ,Government League, ninety-five percent of
whose activity was essentially educational, and only five percent of whose time
was spent attempting to influence legislation, was held to be an organization to
which an income tax deductible contribution could be made. The court said it
liberally construed a remedial statute44 and found the organization's political
activities insubstantial when related to its remaining undertakings." The heart
of the decision was the court's characterization of the attempts at propaganda to
influence legislation. "There is nothing in the findings of fact... that the activities
of the League were exerted for a selfish, unethical purpose, or is anywise lacking
in good faith."46 The court read the section prohibiting "or otherwise attempting"
to influence legislation as equivalent to a prohibition against lobbying.
A judicial organization ran afoul of the political activities section in Luther
Ely Smith."7 An association advocating the amendment of the state constitution
40 Slee v. Commissioner, supra note 39, at 185.
41 The following cases found the League of Women Voters qualified under the political
activities test: Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 759 (W.D. Ky.
1954); Luther Ely Smith, 3 T.C. 696 (1944); Charles W. Dahlinger, 20 B.T.A. 176 (1930),
aff'd, 51 F.2d 662 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 673 (1931). However, other cases have
held it was not qualified: Kuper v. 'Commissioner, 332 F.2d 562 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 379.
U.S. 920 (1964); League of Women Voters v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 379 (Ct. Cl.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 822 (1960); Henriette T. Noyes, 31 B.T.A. 121 (1934).
In order to assure a prospective donor that his contribution will not be disallowed, a
separate educational fund has been established by the League. See 'Cumulative List, U.S.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, ORoANIZATIONs DEsCIUBED IN SECTION 170(c) oF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE Or 1954 (1964). Compare the attempt to establish a unit for political agita-
tion in Krohn v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 341, 345 (D. Colo. 1965), where the state
medical society established COMPAC in order to oppose Medicare. This would be one way
to requalify a charitable organization that had noncharitable interests. See 18 U.S:C. § 610
(1964), where unions are forbidden to engage in certain political activities. An independent
organization, the Committee on Political Education (COPE), has been established for political
agitationmby the AFL-CIO.
42 In Huntington Nat'1 Bank, 13 T.C. 760 (1949), acquiesced in 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 1,
3, a woman's club that promoted legislation for the education and welfare of children was
found only insubstantially engaged in questionable activity. However, where the National
Woman's Party attempted to promote women's rights, it was found not to qualify. Vanderbilt
v. Commissioner, 93 F.2d 360 (1st Cir. 1937).
43 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955).
44 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170.
45 Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907, 910 (6th Cir. 1955).
46 Ibid.
47 3 T.C. 696 (1944). But see Rev. Rul. 64-195, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 138 (Nonpartisan
court reform.no effect on tax exempt status). Cf. Alfred A. Cook, 30 B.T.A. 292 (1934),
where a contribution to a committee to study the reform of bankruptcy laws was not allowed
as an income tax deduction.
[December 1966]
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for the adoption of what was to become the Missouri Non-Partisan Court Plan
was held not to be an educational organization within the meaning of section
2055, since its purpose was to change the law by amending the state constitution.
The American Institute of Architects was also denied an exemption because of a
claim that it engaged in propaganda.4 8
Remarks of an assistant commissioner before a House Committee'9 were
followed by definitions of nonexempt organizations in the regulations. In essence,
the regulations defined a nonexempt association as an "action" organization
and went on to list various activities. If the organization engaged in these
activities, it would be denied favorable tax status.50
Once the courts adopt the substantial, incidental, or subservient test, no
objective rule is possible; each organization must stand or fall on the facts of
the case. Consequently, cases involving professional associations must be carefully
scrutinized to discover the decisive facts.
III. The Bar Associations
Although the term bar association is frequently used generically, all attorneys
are aware that the name may designate anything from a powerful, integrated state
bar,51 to the local association of attorneys at the county seat.
48 Montgomery v. United States, 63 Ct. Cl. 588 (1927).
49 "Congress saw fit only to circumscribe the exemption with a restriction against sub-
stantial activities to influence legislation." Hearings Before the Special House Committee To
Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess.
433 (1954).
50 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (1959) provides an organization is not exemptwhen it: (a) Contacts, or urges the public to contact, members of a legislative body for
the purpose of proposing, supporting, or opposing legislation; or
(b) Advocates the adoption or rejection of legislation. [This includes national,
state, and municipal legislation and such activity must be substantial.]
(iii) An organization is an "action" organization if it participates or intervenes,
directly or indirectly, in any political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any
candidate for public ofice.... Activities which constitute participation or interven-
tion in a political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to a candidate include, but
are not limited to, the publication or distribution of written or printed statements or
the making of oral statements on behalf of or in opposition to such a candidate.
(iv) An organization is an "action" organization if it has the following two
characteristics: (a) Its main or primary objective or objectives (as distinguished
from its incidental or secondary objectives) may be attained only by legislation or a
defeat of proposed legislation; and (b) it advocates, or campaigns for, the attain-
ment of such main or primary objective or objectives as distinguished from engaging
in nonpartisan analysis, study, or research and making the results thereof available to
the public. In determining whether an organization has such characteristics, all the
surrounding facts and circumstances, including the articles and all activities of the
organization, are to be considered.
51 See Rev. Rul. 59-152, 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 54. A state bar association was created by
statute as a public corporation and had authority to exercise governmental functions in regulat-
ing the practice of law. It was ruled that contributions to such an organization were deductible
under the provisions of § 2055 since the organization had a governmental purpose. But cf.
Lathrope v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961). The Wisconsin Supreme Court required all at-
torneys to pay dues to the integrated state bar. An attorney objected and refused to pay his
dues claiming the association expressed an opinion on legislative matters contrary to his own.
In an opinion of four of the Justices in the majority, it was said:
We think that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in order to further the State's
legitimate interests in raising the quality of professional services, may constitutionally
require that the costs of improving the profession in this fashion should be shared
by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program, the lawyers, even though
NOTE
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Dulles v. Johnson 2 involved three different bar associations: The New
York State Bar Association, the New York County Bar Association, 'and the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York. Applying the organization test,
the district court examined the certificate of incorporation of the New, York
County Bar Association, which was similar to that of the others. It provided for
the promotion of reforms in the law; the facilitation of the administration
of justice; the elevation of the standards of integrity, honor and courtesy
in the legal profession; the cherishing of the spirit of brotherhood among
members of said Association."5
In denying an estate tax deduction for a gift to the Association, the court
found:
On their faces therefore, the sets of articles of incorporation indicate that
none of the three organizations was organized exclusively for charitable,
scientific, literary, or educational purposes. Further, it is clear that one of
the purposes of each of them was the "promotion of reforms in the law".
This would suggest that one of the purposes of organization was "attempt-
ing to influence legislation.
54
The court was not blinded by the organizational requirement and recognized
that "the purposes of the organizations should also be examined in the light of
their actual operations, and not limited to the intent expressed in the articles of
incorporation." 5
On review, several of the activities of these associations were further
enumerated by the Second Circuit. The County and City Bar maintained large
libraries and published magazines. As to their social activities, the court deemed
them "incidental [and] . . . auxiliary to the charitable and educational pur-
poses." 6 The Second Circuit looked to the four activities it felt were the major
the organization created to attain the objective also engages in some legislative activ-
ity. Id. at 843.
The legislative activity included the appointment of an executive director who registered as a
lobbyist in accordance with state law and the taking of a formal position on a number of
legislative questions. These included making attorneys notaries public and using deceased
partners' names in the name of a law firm. Id. at 835, 837. While the case does not hold, as
would the Wisconsin Supreme Court and two of the concurring Justices, that a person may be
constitutionally compelled to contribute support to political activities he opposes, id. at 847-48,
it allowed an integrated state bar to engage in a wide range of political activities. While §
2055(1), allowing a deduction from the gross estate for a transfer to a governmental unit for
exclusively public purposes, does not include the limitation on political activities of a propa-
ganda nature, the extent to which an integrated state bar may influence legislation and still
receive a tax-free gift arguably should not differ from the limits on other bar associations.
52 155 F. Supp. 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), rev'd, 273 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 834 (1960). Cf. Stearns v. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 154
Misc. 71, 276 N.Y.S. 390 (1934) (Charitable immunity found for association in negligence
action); Thomas v. Harrison, 24 Ohio Op. 2d 148, 191 N.E.2d 862 (1962) (a gift to a bar
association would be a charitable gift).
53 Dulles v. Johnson, supra note 52, at 277-78.
54 Id. at 278.
55 Id. at 279., In Better Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945), the
Court interpreted the "organized and operated" section and warned that the words should not
be given unusual or tortuous interpretations. It denied the BBB an exemption from Social
Security taxes, finding it essentially an organization for the advancement of businessmen.




reasons the district court denied the deduction. Its analysis finding them chari-
table activities is worthy of careful study.
1. Regulating the Unauthorized Practice of Law. The argument that
this activity is not charitable is based on its elimination of competitive
activity. However, the bar associations were empowered expressly by
statute to engage in this activity, and were the bar not to regulate itself,
the public would have to bear this heavy responsibility. Since the public
is being relieved of a duty by these associations, this activity is charitable.57
2. Disciplining the Profession. Does the "increased public esteem for
Jawyers" 8 benefit the bar or the public? The court resolved this question
by observing that the public must act on faith in dealing with lawyers.
It held: "The true benefit from a disciplined and socially responsive bar
accrues directly to the public."*59
3. Improving Court Procedures and Endorsing Judicial Candidates. The
nonpartisan, technical nature of this activity and the special ability of
lawyers to answer questions of this kind were found by the court to be
activities related to public service, and thus not of a selfish political nature.
4. Influencing Legislation. The court viewed the term "legislation" as
capable of division. There is substantive legislation and merely technical
legislation.
The Associations' work has been expressed in expert reports on matters
uniquely within the fields of experts and has avoided questions which are
outside those fields, i.e., questions which turn largely on economic or political
decisions.
These activities serve no selfish purpose of the legal profession - rather
they constitute an expert's effort to improve the law in technical and non-
controversial areas. They are not intended for the economic aggrandizement
of a particular group or to promote some larger principle of governmental
policy.60
While it is certainly true that a request from a lawyer for a change in the law
may be of a technical nature, it is also true that changes in the law are his
business, and a layman could see a business benefit to a lawyer in a restructurifig
of the court system. The members of a medical association could contend they
should have a similar opportunity, while still enjoying the benefits of favorable
tax treatment, to influence the regulation of their profession by a government
health insurance law or a professional incorporation law.
In Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. United States,6 the court found a
bar association bequest entitled to favorable estate tax treatment. This result
57 Id. at 366. Cf. Duffy v. Birmingham, 190 F.2d 738 (8th Cir. 1951), wherein a trust
to provide pensions for employees of a given corporation did not qualify for the exemption
from income tax, since it did not relieve the community of a burden it would otherwise owe
these employees. Many problems arise when a charitable bequest is made in trust for a limited
class of beneficiaries. See generally, BOGERr, TausTs AND TRUSTES § 362 (2d ed. 1964).
58 Dulles v. Johnson, supra note 56, at 366.
59. Ibid.
60 Id. at 367. But cf. Alfred A. Cook, 30 B.T.A. 292 (1934), where a grant to a com-
mittee of the same association for the study of the bankruptcy laws was held not deductible
for income tax purposes.
61 159 F. Supp. 204 (D.R.I. 1958).
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differs from that in Duies because the court found a gift in trust for a specific
purpose. This case thus avoided the otherwise necessary finding tliat the bar
association must meet the organized and operated exclusively test, as well as
the requirement of no substantial legislative activity. The testator's words were
held to create an express trust for limited purposes, and not an absolute gift.
62
He provided:
to the Rhode Island Bar Association to be used and employed by it for the
advancement and upholding of those standards of the profession which are
assumed by the members upon their admission to the Bar, and for the
prosecution and punishment of those members who violate their obligations
to the court and to the public.63
The association was unincorporated. Its purposes as outlined in its constitution
were "to maintain the honor and dignity of the profession of the law, to increase
its usefulness in promoting the due administration of justice, and to cultivate
social intercourse among its members."6 4 One of its committees was concerned
with statutory amendments and had publicly expressed the opinion of the as-
sociation on proposed legislation and judicial appointments. This activity was
held not to be substantial within the terms of section 2055. The court relied on
state law6" to determine the federal tax question and held Rhode Island law
required no particular words to create a trust, the testator's intent being determi-
native. The court said there was a clear intent to create an express trust for the
benefit of mankind and public convenience.6 6
The court's approach in this case is not in harmony with the law. Under
section 2055 (a) (3), once the court found a trust for an express purpose, it should
have looked to this express purpose and not to the provisions of the bar associa-
tion constitution. Further, the legislative activity of the bar association should
not have been considered. The statute is drawn in reference to the trustee's
activity. It specifically reads: "And no substantial part of the activities of such
trustee or trustees... is carrying on propaganda .... "" The statute is ambiguous
in its failure to specify either activity in general, or activity as trustee. Thus, a
gift in trust, for library purposes, to the central committee of a political party
might encounter difficulty. This problem, however, could be met by observing
that a trustee is held to the terms of the trust instrument, and engaging in political
activity, in his capacity as trustee, could be restrained by the court. The "trustee's
activity" should be defined by the trust instrument since it governs the scope of
his operations.
Saint Louis Union Trust Co. v. United States"5 presented the court with a
62 Id. at 207.
63 Id. at 205.
64 Ibid.
65 Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940). "State law creates legal interests and
rights. The federal revenue acts designate what interests or rights, so created, shall be taxed."
Id. at 80. See Hassett v. Associated Hosp. Serv. Corp., 125 F.2d 611 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
316, U.S. 672 (1942). Cf. Thompson v. Wiseman, 233 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1956). But cf.
Hight v. United States, 256 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1958), where it was said that the ultimate deci-
sion as to a federal tax exemption rests in a federal court.
66 Rhode Island Hosp. Trust 'Co. v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 204, 207 (D.R.I. 1958).
67 INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 2055(a) (2).
68 16 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6173 (E.D. Mo. 1965).
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different kind of bar association and a different kind of gift. Judge Landwehr
devised his residuary estate to a trustee
to provide a suitable building and facilities to serve as a headquarters,
office and meeting place of the Bar Association of St. Louis, and under
its control as a meeting place for all lawyers and associations of lawyers
in the St. Louis area."9
The constitution of the Association provided many of the same organizational
purposes as did that of the New York County Bar Association. The bequest
was found by a jury to be a transfer to an organization not organized and oper-
ated exclusively for charitable purposes.
In its brief on appeal the government focused on the issues it thought were
of a substantial, noncharitable, noneducational nature. The Association's con-
tinuing legal education program was coupled with the consideration of very prac-
tical subjects, such as the settlement of negligence cases. 0 Its social activities
included an annual golf tournament and annual Christmas party. The goyern-
ment argued:
Under even the most critical scrutiny every portion of the record fairly
blossoms with evidence of nonconforming purposes and activities which are
devoted not exclusively to the public's benefit but are clearly carried on in
large measure for the professional benefit of lawyers. The recurrent con-
cern of the Association and its members with the economics' of the practice
of law - the level of legal fees, encouraging the hiring of lawyers by dis-
tribution of pamphlets and recommending annual legal checkups - is
the very epitome of everything that an eleemosynary institution is not.
71
The government also emphasized that operating dining facilities is as a non-
charitable activity. In applying for the A.B.A. Award of Merit in 1961, the
Association described the opening of the headquarter's dining room as a "really
substantial program" which resulted in a major dues hike."2 In the trial court,
the government undoubtedly was helped by the fact that the jury could clearly
understand that a dining room is not a charitable or educational function.
While the decision on appeal has not been handed down, at a minimum, this
case stands as a warning to anyone contemplating an outright gift to a pro-
fessional association. Careful inquiry should be made for a possible incidental
activity which is more than insubstantial. Broadly, it warns against any gift to a
professional association to be used for its general purposes.
In the Dulles case, the court classified the social activities of the New York
County Bar Association as incidental to its charitable and educational purposes.73
Many charitable organizations maintain dining rooms. Such undertakings have
usually been held auxiliary to the organization's main purposes.'4 It would seem
69 Brief for Appellant, p. 4, Saint Louis Union Trust Co. v. United States, 16 Am. Fed.
Tax R.2d 6173 (E.D. Mo. 1965).
70 Brief for Appellee, p. 5, Saint Louis Union Trust Co. v. United States, 16 Am. Fed.
Tax R.2d 6173 (E.D. Mo. 1965).
71 Id. at 16-17.
72 Id. at 18.
73 See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
74 City Club v. United States, 46 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Wis. 1942); Aviation Club of Utah,
7 T.C. 377, aiffd, 162 F.2d 984 (10th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 837 (1947).
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the Dulles court looked first to the primary purpose of the organization and de-
termined it was charitable, whereas the court in St. Louis Union, Trust Co. v.
United States was more concerned with the statutory test and the substantiality
of nonexempt enterprises.
IV. The Medical Associations
Hammerstein v. Kelley 5 represents the case of an "alm6st" successful attempt
to benefit a medical society. The settlor provided a trust to be used for library
purposes for a period of twenty-five years with a gift over to the society at the
end of this time. She further provided, however, that it could be terminated
before that time in the sole discretion of the trustee. The possibility' that the
trust might be terminated was fatal."0  The statutory tests of organization,
operation, and political activity thus became applicable to the medical asso-
ciation rather than to the trust. The association failed'to meet the tests. The
court relied on a case that took an extremely rigid approach. In Frank E.
Castle," the Tax Court denied an estate tax deduction where a medical asso-
ciation had no social activities, being concerned only with technical matters
and the maintenance of a library. Nevertheless, the organization did not meet
the organized and operated exclusively test. That members were informed of
new developments in medicine seemed to be a reason for denying an exemption,
but the court's primary concern was the organization test. Since the purposes of
the association were the establishment of the practice of medicine on a respectable
footing; the mutual improvement of the members; and the promotion of good
understanding and harmonious intercourse, the court concluded that the associa-
tion did not meet the statutory test.
The Hammerstein court noted two possible approaches. It could follow the
bar association cases, looking at specific questionable activities; or it could look
to the nature of charitable activity. The latter approach, followed by the court,
is commendable, as it gives added perspective in understanding the nature of a
charitable exemption. The court relied on Duffy v. Birmingham"5 as authority
for the proposition that one of the many meanings of "charity" is relieving the
community of an obligation owed by the government to the entire populace. It
searched older decisions for definitions of "charity" that eventually led it to the
Elizabethan Statute of Charitable Uses and the great body of law that developed
construing the word "charitable." 79 The court concluded: "The cases hold a
charity is a broad term, conveying more an idea than a specific meaning; it
relates to the social good, the welfare of the community, existing for the good
75 235 F. Supp. 60 (E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1965). A series of
articles by Richard Harris has comprehensively examined the efforts of the American, Medical
Association as it influenced, and attempted to influence, governmental action in the field of
"Medicare." The New Yorker, Annals of Legislation-Medicare, July 2, 1966, p. 29; July 9,
1966, p. 30; July 16, 1966, p. 35; July 23, 1966, p. 35.
76 Hammerstein v. Kelly, supra note 75, at 66. See Commissioner v. Sternberger's Estate,
348 U.S. 187 (1955).
77 9 B.T.A. 174 (1930).
78 190 F.2d 738 (8th Cir. 1951). See note 55 supra.
79 43 Eliz. 1, c. 4 (1601) (repealed). See generally, RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TRUSTS
§§ 368-74 (1959). BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 57, § 369.
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of the people as a whole." 0 The court continued with what is perhaps the key
to its decision.
In this regard the facts disclose that the St. Louis Medical Society is not
a true charitable organization, but rather, is an oiganization composed of
members of a particular'-profession who have common interests and aims,
and an organization which has one prime concern and purpose - the
welfare of that profession. . .Its service to the individual is not merely
secondary or incidental, but rather is primary.... [The Society's] primary
concern and purpose still remains to be the best interests of the medical
profession and the individual members of the Society."-
The court contrasted some of the medical association's activities with bar associa-
tion activities. The ethics committee did not have the statutory authority to
discipline members, as do bar association grievance committees. The medical
association's legislative interests included the age at which Social Security benefits
were available, medical treatment in veterans' hospitals, Medicare, and municipal
and professional incorporation legislation. It had endorsed members of the as-
sociation who campaigned for public office on a platform opposing "socialized
medicine." The society also conducted a public relations campaign and engaged
in other service activities for its members. The court concluded that many of
these activities, including the political and legislative activities, deprived the
association of preferred tax treatment. Against this impressive array of data, it
would be difficult for one to argue for a deduction.With this background, the result reached in Krohn v. United States"2 was pre-
dictable. The court held a trust for the benefit of the Denver Medical Society did
not qualify under Section 2055. The society argued that when its charitable activi-
ties were compared to its noncharitable activities, the latter were incidental. The
medical society's publication, library, and scientific meetings were considered.
But even the publication0 was called into question. While "it contains some educa-
tional material [it]-;. . also c ontains much other material, the value of which is
personal to the individual doctors rather than to society as a whole."" The court
considered the Seasongood4 result, where an organization met the political
activities test when only five percent of its activity was legislative. The Krohn
court found this a
questionable approach to the problem. The apparent certainty 'of a percent
test obscures the basic difficulties of balancing activities in the context of
organizational objectives and circumstances. For example, the amount
of non-public activity arguably "substantial" may wellvary between religious
groups and labor organizations."
V. The Charitable Trust'
A. Express Trusts and Absolute Gifts
In Philadelphia Baptist Ass'n v. Hart," Chief Justice Marshall decided that
80 Hammerstein v. Kelly, 235 F. Supp. 60, 63 (E.D. Mo. 1964).
81 Ibid.
82 246 F. Supp. 341 (D. Colo. 1965).
83 Id. at 344.
84 Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955).
85 Krohn v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 341, 347-48 (D. Colo. 1965).
86 17 U.S. (4 'Wheat.) 1 (1819). See Vidal v. Girard's Ex'r, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 126
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a charitable trust could not be enforced since the Statute of Charitable UsesF
had been repealed in Virginia. Further, he reasoned that in the absence of this
statute a charitable trust could not be enforced by a court of equity. This reason-
ing was the most notorious historical objection to the charitable trust. Charitable
trusts were also attacked as lacking definite beneficiaries 8 Further, it was con-
tended they were in violation of the rule against perpetuities.89 Today these
objections are, in large part, a thing of the past, but the rules that were formulated
in response to them are still found in the law. For example, the courts construed
gifts in trust as absolute gifts to charitable corporations, so that a rule that would
have made the charitable trust void could be evaded. Since it is possible to
secure advantages for a trust under section 2055 that would not be available to
a corporation receiving an absolute gift, it is important to consider the circum-
stances under which a gift may be declared a trust and those under which it
may be held a gift absolute.
A charitable trust like an express private trust, is created only if the settlor
properly manifests an intention to create it. The settlor need not, however,
use any particular language in showing his intention to create a charitable
trust; he need not use the word "trust" or "trustee." It is sufficient if he
shows an intention that the property should be held subject to a legal
obligation to devote it to purposes which are charitable.90
Maryland cases illustrate one state's experience with restrictive rules on the
creation of charitable trusts. In Woman's Foreign Missionary Soc'y v. Mitchell,9
a bequest was given "in trust." Faced with the challenge that the objects of the
trust were "vague, indefinite, and uncertain,"92 the court found an absolute gift.
It might be said that- the design was to create a trust ... but when it is
remembered that the very end which the corporation here made the bene-
ficiary was organized to effect is [the purpose of the trust] it becomes
evident that the property was given to the corporation not in trust for
indefinite objects, but . . . for its recognized and clearly defined corporate
purposes.
93
The reasons a court might reach such a conclusion, even in the absence of a
restrictive rule, are clear. To impose the obligations of a trustee upon a charitable
corporation is unnecessary if the purpose of the trust is the same as the charitable
corporation's purpose. Thus, in Baltzell v. Church Home & Infirmary,94 the
court construed a gift, to be used for the support of poor, respectable sewing girls
(1844), where Mr. Binney's historical research, demonstrating that equity had enforced chari-
table trusts in the absence of the Statute of Charitable Uses, persuaded the Court to reverse
itself. See generally, BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 57, § 362; 4 SCOTT, TRUSTS, § 364 (2d ed.
1956).
87 43 Eliz. 1, c. 4 (1601) (repealed).
88 See BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 57, § 362; SCOTT, op. cit. supra note 86, § 364.
89 See BOGERT, Op. cit. supra note 57, §§ 341, 342; SCOTT, op. cit. supra note 86, § 365.
Statutes exist which limit the amount of land a corporation may hold; other statutes limit the
monetary value of a charity's property. See BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 57, § 327.
90 SCOTT, op. cit. supra note 86, § 351.
91 93 Md. 199, 48 Atl. 737 (1901).
92 Id. at 205, 48 At. at 739.
93 Id. at 205-06, 48 Ati. at 740.
94 110 Md. 244, 73 Atl. 151 (1909).
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as not in trust, on the theory that to rule it a trust would be to declare an organi-
zation trustee for itself.95 Maryland legislatively clarified the status of charitable
trusts by declaring that a charitable trust is valid despite indefinite lbeneficiaries,
or existence beyond a'limited time.9"
This legislation, however, did not change habits established under the old
law. In New York, the Tilden Act of 1893"' removed restrictions on charitable
trusts. In St. Joieph's Hosp. v. Bennett,9 a hospital was the beneficiary of a
permanent fund, the income of which was to be used for ordinary maintenance
expenses. The hospital wished to apply this fund in payment of a mortgage.
Finding the hospital to have received a gift-absolute for a corporate purpose, the
court held the funds could not be so applied since the fund was restricted to a
stated purpose. However, no trust was established. "In the absence of language
requiring other construction, a gift to a charitable corporation was construed as a
gift to the corporation not in trust for others but a gift in perpetuity for a cor-
porate purpose."99 A recent case has approved the holding in St. Joseph's Hosp.
It was held in In re Staas' Estate"0 that a gift in trust to a historical society is not
a trust but an outright gift.
An absolute gift has also been held to be a gift in trust. Thus, in In re
Estate of Peterson,1"' where a bequest was made for a children's home and a
home for the aged, the court said: "a devise or bequest, although in form an
outright gift, yet when made to an institution whose sole reason for existence and
whose entire activity is charitable, is in purpose and practical effect a charitable
trust."' In a case where property was conveyed without restrictions to a chari-
table corporation, upon an attempted dissolution of the corporation, the property
was held to be in trust for charitable purposes.0
For the purposes of section 2055, these cases stand as a warning, yet they
also present an opportunity. In a jurisdiction where there has been a tendency
to construe gifts in trust as gifts-absolute, the case law should be studied, and the
trust instrument carefully drafted to avoid a transfer to a charitable corporation
with possible nonexempt purposes. Where apparent gifts-absolute have been
95 In Corporation of the Chamber of Commerce v. Bennett, 143 Misc. 513, 257 N.Y.S. 2
(1932), property was conveyed to a charitable corporation. A restriction in the gift that the
property should be applied only to one of the corporation's purposes was held of no effect, since
the absolute owner of property cannot be restricted in its use. However, whether it is a trust
or not determines if a legal or equitable remedy is available, and this question is often im-
portant. The different duties imposed upon a trustee and a corporation also deserve considera-
tion. See note 4 supra.
96 MD. ANN. CoDp art. 93, §§ 348, 357 (1957).
97 L.1893, c. 701, now N. Y. PEss. PROP. LAW § 12, N. Y. RE AL Phop. LAW § 113.
98 281 N.Y. 115, 22 N.E.2d 305 (1939).
99 Id. at 120, 22 N.E.2d at 307. 1,
100 235 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Surr. Ct. 1962). See Zabel v. Stewart, 153 Kan. 272, 109 P.2d 177
(1941), where a gift left to a charitable corporation to be used for the building and furnishing
of a church was held to be a gift-absolute to the church, since it was to aid the purposes for
which the corporation was formed; and In re MacFarland's Estate, 95 N.Y.S.2d 258 (Surr. Ct.
1950),, where a gift to be used for memorial flowers every Sunday in a church was subjected to
cy pres, and -held an absolute gift for other church purposes. See generally, BOGERT, op. cit.
supra note 57, § 324.
101 202 Minn. 31, 277 N.W. 529 (1938).
102 Id. at 36, 277 N.W. at 532. Accord, In re Estate of Munson, 238 Minn. 358, 57
N.W.2d 22 (1953), where an outright gift to an orphan's home with no mention of a trust
was held a trust for a charitable corporation.




found to be gifts in trust, a cogent argument can be made for finding a de-
ductible gift in trust to the charitable corporation ,with activities that are possibly
noncharitable. The gift should be characterized as in trust for a charitable pur-
pose. Only the purpose of the trust will have to meet the tests of the statute.
B. Constructive Trusts
Another possibility of attaining trust status is the constructive trust approach.
In Delaney v. Gardner,"0' an estate tax deduction was claimed. Instead of leaving
sums to named beneficiaries,- a memorandum listing recommended individuals
and institutions was found with; and construed as part of, the will. It provided
the executors could, in their best judgment, alter the proposed distribution. The
lower court found a constructive trust for charitable purposes, since the execu-
tors had followed the memorandum. It reasoned any, of-, the named charities
could have compelled the executors to pay over the amount intended as a con-
structive trust."5 The First Circuit disagreed. It found the executors not bound
by the memorandum,"0 6 stating:
[S]ince § 812(d) offers to testators the privilege of deducting certain dis-
positions beneficial to society, then the policy underlying such a privilege
would 'be best effectuated by requiring a clear and definite exercise of the
privilege in the testamentary instrument' 07
,In dissent it was argued that the word "transfer" in the statute is broad
enough to embrace a constructive trust.
[The statute] should be construed to cover the transfer of money from an
estate to a charity accomplished by the device of a constructive trust imposed
by local law on a testamentary disposition because of a testator's reliance
upon his legate&s agreement to 'hold the devise for the benefit of the
charity.' 8
In Marine Midland Trust Co. v. McGowan,"9 the Second Circuit adopted this
view. An estate tax deduction was claimed for a gift to an unincorporated
college fraternity. Shortly after the testator's death, then fraternity incorporated
an educational foundation and assigned its rights in the bequest to the exempt
organization. There was no doubt that the testator intended his gift for educa-
tional purposes. He was informed erroneously that the educational foundation
had been incorporated. Although it was an outright gift to the fraternity, and
no purpose for the funds was stated in the will, it was held a constructive trust
for exclusively charitable purposes.
Cox v. Commissioner,"' in the same circuit, imposed a limitation on the
104 103 F. Supp. 610 (D. Mass. 1952), vacated,.204 F.2d 855 (lst Cir. 1953).
105 Id. at 613.
106 Delaney v. Gardner, 204 F.2d 855, 860 (1st Cir. 1953).
107 Id. at 859. § 812(d) of the Int. Rev. Code of 1939 became § 2055 of the INT. R-V.
CODE OF 1954.
108 Delaney v. Gardner, supra note 106, at 864.
109 223 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1955).
110 297 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1961).
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concept of a constructive trust that has been adopted' elsewhere.11 , In Cox a
bequest was made to an ordained priest who had taken the vow of poverty.
Refusing to establish a constructive trust, the court held that the bequest was
to the named individual and not to his religious order. The reasoning in these
cases is the same. Where a gift is to a named individual, the courts will not
rewrite the instrument so as to create a constructive gift for the charitable
corporation. , r -
Levey v. Smith." represents an unsuccessful attempt to obtain an estate
tax deduction, via the constructive trust approach, where iv was contended that
a gift was to a group organized and operated exclusively for a charitable purpose.
The court said:
The facts must be such that the failure of the legatee to use the gift for
educational, religious or -charitabte purposes will constitute a breach of
a legal duty created by the act of acceptance of the trust res under con-
dtions imposed by the' testator. . . . Plaintiff urges that the statutory test
"is the use to which the: property is to be pitt." In our view the test is:
"For what purpose ,is the property devised?"s13 , ,
The strong emphasis in the Levey- case on the act of the testator may be
favorably employed in arguing for a constructive trust under the McGowan
rationale. The constructive trust fails where an attempt is made to turn a gift to
an individual into a gift to a corporation.' 4 Construing the gift as a constructive
trust for one of the exempt purposes of a charitable corporation should be a less
difficult task.
A frequent object of a gift to a professional association is its library."5
It was earlier noted that the Hammerstein case almost recognized the establish-
ment of a deductible trust for library purposes." 6 The trust failed only because
the trustee had discretionary power to terminate it at any time. A revenue ruling
sets the standards for gifts ,to a library."' It must operate exclusively for the
exempt purpose; maintain separate books and accounts; i'd organize in a man-
ner that prevents the use of its assets for the general purposes of the organization
rather than purposes similar to those, of the.fund itself.
Elizabeth L. Audenrei214, held that a bequest in trust for law library pur-
poses met the requirerrents of section 2055. The court rejected arguments that
the library was an integral part of the,bar association, and it'rejected the con-
111 Lamson's Estate v. United States, 338 F.2d 376 (Ct. Cl. 1964); Estate of Barry v.
Commissioner, 311 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1962). See also Margaret E. Callaghan, 33 T.C. 870
(1960); George W. Dichtel, 30 T.C. 1258 (1958);'Rev. ,Rul. 55-759, 1955-2 Cum. BuLL. 607.
112 103 F.2d 643 (7th Cir), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 578 (1939).-
113 Id. at 647-48.
114 In Young Men's Christian Ass'n v. Davis, 264"US. 47, 50 (1924), the Court said:
Congress was thus looking at the subject from the standpoint of the testator and
not from the immediate point of view of the beneficiaries. It was intendiig to favor
gifts for altruistic objects, not by specific exemption of those gifts but by encouraging
testators to make such gifts. Congress was in reality dealing with the testator before
his death.
115 See United States v. Proprietors of Social Law Library, 102 F.2d 481 (1st Cir. 1939),
qualifying a law library as exempt under the organized and operated clause.
116 See text accompanying note 75 supra.
117 Rev. Rul. 58-293, 1958-1 Cum. BULL. 146.
118 26 T.-C. 120 (1956). ' ,
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tention that limitations on membership to the judiciary and dues paying mem-
bers should bar a deduction. The court found that the library's availability
to all who paid their dues was sufficient to treat the bequest as one for educa-
tional purposes.
A case which casts doubt on a gift to a law library being found a trust is
Gately v. El Paso County Bar Ass'n."9 An attorney, who was not a member
of the county bar association, sought a declaratory judgment authorizing him
to use the bar association library, which had been given by the testator. He
contended that the library was a gift in trust and that he fit the description of
those in the will for whom the library was given. His contentions were rejected,
and the library was held to be an absolute gift. The court reasoned that the
testator's failure to provide money to supplement library materials was incon-
sistent with the duty that would be imposed on the trustee to keep them current.
The court held that without a fund for supplementation, a constructive trust
could not be found. Thus, an argument can be advanced that a gift to a law
library is not the proper subject of a constructive trust, as a law library trust
should be accompanied by a special fund for supplementation. However, the
court's reasoning, that a trustee would be under an obligation to keep the library
current, could likewise be called into question.
VI. Conclusion
To achieve favorable estate tax treatment of a gift to a professional asso-
ciation, the transfer may be either an outright gift to a charitable corporation
or a transfer in trust for a specific charitable purpose. The course of making
an outright gift is exceedingly unwise. The corporation must be both organized
and operated for an exclusively charitable purpose. The cases demonstrate that
a professional association frequently has discordant purposes in its charter and
has a tendency to venture into fields where the charitable status of its activities
is doubtful. The latter problem has become particularly acute when the asso-
ciation seeks to influence legislation which, by statutory definition, is incom-
patible with qualification for a charitable deduction.
A trust does not encounter the above difficulties. By choosing a charitable,
educational, or scientific purpose- for example a library- and by providing
definite trust language, the gift is assured favorable treatment. Most organiza-
tions with truly charitable purposes seldom have legislative designs; thus this
test is not relevant.
The problem is primarily one for the draftsman. A discussion at a pre-
liminary stage will develop an acceptable object for the gift, while at the same
time achieving the maximum tax advantage. Failure to plan in advance is an
invitation to later litigation.
Gerard K. Sandweg
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